AI — The New Kill Chain · chapter 1 of 30

Introduction

1,697 words7 min

📜 “The wound is the place where the Light enters you.” — Jalal Din ar-Rumi

At sun rise, somewhere along a silent frontline, a young operator adjusts a pair of goggles.

He is not inside a tank. He is not in a cockpit.

He is sitting in a trench, holding something that costs less than his phone.

A few kilometers away, a convoy moves slowly along a broken road.

The soldiers inside are exhausted, but calm. No aircraft. No artillery.

Then someone hears it.

Not loud. Not fast.

Just a faint electric hum.

They look up.

Too late.

The drone lifts.

The war begins.

And ends.

In less than five minutes.

Purpose of This Book

This book was written with a single, urgent conviction: the nature of warfare has changed permanently, and most of the world’s governments, military establishments, and citizens have not yet grasped the scale or speed of the transformation.

Between 2020 and 2026, three overlapping conflicts—the Russia-Ukraine war, the Iran-Israel confrontation, and the Houthi Red Sea campaign—served as live laboratories for a new kind of warfare. In these conflicts, weapons costing a few hundred dollars destroyed platforms worth millions. Artificial intelligence compressed decision cycles from hours to seconds. Hobbyists and startup founders proved as consequential as four-star generals and legacy defense contractors. And the economic models that sustained Western military dominance for decades were revealed as brittle.

The purpose of this book is threefold. First, to document what happened: the specific technologies, tactics, and organizational innovations that emerged from these conflicts, grounded in verifiable data and sourced analysis. Second, to explain what it means: how these developments reshape the balance of power between nations, alter the economics of conflict, and challenge the assumptions underpinning existing defense strategies. Third, to explore what comes next: the future flashpoints, the emerging powers, the institutional reforms, and the ethical frameworks that the world will need.

This is not an academic treatise. It is intended for anyone—policy-makers, military professionals, entrepreneurs, students, and concerned citizens—who wants to understand why a $500 drone can now change history, and what that means for the world their children will inherit. The analysis draws on publicly available research from leading defense institutions, open-source intelligence, official military briefings, and contemporary strategic commentary, including the widely discussed geopolitical analyses of Jiang Xueqin. Where data is uncertain, that uncertainty is acknowledged. Where prediction is offered, it is clearly identified as such.

The future is not predetermined. The wars described in these pages were fought by people making choices under pressure. The wars that may come will be shaped by the choices we make now. This book aims to inform those choices.

“Yesterday I was clever, so I wanted to change the world. Today I am wise, so I am changing myself.” — Jalal Din ar-Rumi

But nations are not wise. They are reactive. And in this new era, they are being forced to change—not by choice, but by the speed of the world around them.

Opening scene: 24 Hours on the Front

The following account is reconstructed from open-source reporting, published interviews with Ukrainian and Russian soldiers, and verified social media posts from frontline operators. It represents a composite of typical conditions along the Pokrovsk sector of the Donetsk front in mid-2025. No classified information was used.

0400: The Shift Change, Silence. Coffee. Cold air.

The bunker smells of damp concrete, cigarette smoke, and the chemical tang of lithium polymer batteries. Private Oleksiy—call sign “Mavka”—takes his position at the FPV station: a folding table with two monitors, a transmitter, and a box of freshly assembled drones, their propellers still wrapped in tape for transport. His partner, Sergeant Dima, sets up the reconnaissance feed from their Mavic observation drone already circling at 400 meters above the tree line.

The night shift reports four kills: two Russian infantry attempting to cross an open field, a supply truck that stopped too long at a forward position, and a BMP-2 infantry fighting vehicle that had been spotted moving along a concealed road. They also lost twelve drones to electronic warfare—the Russian jamming was particularly aggressive last night, and two fiber-optic drones were their only reliable tools after midnight.

Oleksiy is 22 years old. Before the war, he was a competitive drone racer in Dnipro who placed third in a regional championship. He volunteered in March 2024, completed drone pilot training in three weeks, and has been on the front line for eleven months. He estimates he has flown over 800 combat missions and destroyed approximately 40 vehicles and an unknown number of personnel positions. He does not keep a precise count.

0630: First Contact, Screaming on the radio.

Dima spots movement on the reconnaissance feed: a group of four Russian soldiers moving along a trench line approximately 3.5 kilometers away, carrying what appears to be a Kornet anti-tank missile system. They are setting up a firing position that could threaten Ukrainian armor moving up behind the second line.

Oleksiy powers up an FPV drone fitted with a PG-7VL shaped-charge warhead—an RPG round adapted for drone delivery. He puts on his goggles, checks the video feed, and launches. The drone climbs to 150 meters, accelerates forward at approximately 120 km/h. At this range, flight time is about two minutes. He navigates by terrain features: a ruined building, a shell crater, the distinctive shape of a destroyed vehicle that has become a waypoint for every pilot in the sector.

At 800 meters from the target, Russian jamming hits. The video feed stutters, pixelates. The drone’s flight controller switches to AI-assisted mode—the last GPS fix combined with inertial navigation keeps it on course. Oleksiy has approximately ten seconds of visual contact through the interference before the feed stabilizes. He spots the soldiers, adjusts course, and dives. The screen goes white, then black. Kill confirmed by the reconnaissance drone overhead.

Oleksiy removes his goggles, takes a sip of cold coffee, and reaches for the next drone. It is 6:38 in the morning.

1100: The Hunting Hours, Sunlight. Birds.

Mid-morning is peak activity time. Both sides’ drone units are fully operational, and the airspace above no-man’s-land is thick with unmanned aircraft. Oleksiy can see, through the reconnaissance feed, at least eight Ukrainian drones and what appear to be five Russian drones operating in his sector alone. The sky is an invisible contest of electromagnetic signals, counter-signals, and the quiet buzz of electric motors.

11:04: Target confirmed.

A Russian Lancet loitering munition is detected on approach to a Ukrainian howitzer position 2 kilometers behind the line. An interceptor drone—a fast, lightweight quadcopter designed specifically to ram incoming threats—is launched from a nearby position. It accelerates to over 200 km/h, closing on the Lancet. The intercept happens at approximately 300 meters altitude: a small flash, two objects tumbling earthward. The howitzer crew does not pause their fire mission. This is routine.

Oleksiy launches three more attack sorties before noon, destroying what his team identifies as a camouflaged ammunition storage point in a farm building, and damaging two vehicles in a supply convoy that exposed itself on a road for approximately 45 seconds too long. One drone is lost to jamming. Another crashes due to a motor failure—a common occurrence with mass-produced components. A third is shot down by a Russian soldier with a shotgun who spotted it at close range. Oleksiy notes the losses with the same detachment a carpenter notes broken drill bits.

1500: The EW Blackout

At 1500, Russian electronic warfare systems in the sector activate a new pattern. The jamming is broader and more intense than usual, suggesting a new system has been deployed or existing systems reconfigured. All radio-controlled drones within approximately 5 kilometers of the front line lose their control links simultaneously. Four Ukrainian drones fall from the sky. Three Russian drones operating in the same zone are also affected—electronic warfare is an indiscriminate weapon that degrades friend and foe alike.

Oleksiy switches to fiber-optic drones. These are heavier, with a spool of thin cable trailing behind, but they are immune to every form of electromagnetic interference. The range is limited to approximately 12 kilometers, but his targets are well within that radius. He launches a fiber-optic FPV and navigates it along a route that keeps the cable clear of obstacles. The video feed is crystal clear, unaffected by the jamming that has blinded every other system in the area.

He finds a Russian electronic warfare vehicle—a truck-mounted jammer that is likely the source of the blackout. It is parked behind a tree line approximately 4 kilometers away, its antenna array visible. He reports the position, and the decision to strike comes quickly: destroying the jammer will restore radio-controlled drone operations across the sector. Oleksiy guides the fiber-optic drone to the target. The explosion knocks the jammer offline. Within minutes, control links to surviving radio-controlled drones are restored. The front breathes again.

2100: Night Operations

Night brings a different rhythm. Thermal cameras replace optical sensors. Targets glow white against the cool ground: vehicle engines, body heat, cooking fires, generator exhaust. The thermal world is starkly binary: hot things stand out; cold things disappear. Russian soldiers who are invisible during the day become thermal beacons at night.

Oleksiy’s night missions focus on logistics: supply trucks, ammunition carriers, and troop rotation movements that the Russians schedule for darkness, hoping the cover of night will protect them. It does not. A truck moving along a road at night is a bright, moving thermal signature easily tracked from a drone circling at 200 meters. Oleksiy destroys two trucks and damages a third before the Russians stop movement in his sector entirely.

By 2300, Oleksiy has completed his shift. He has flown 14 combat sorties, destroyed or damaged 7 targets, lost 5 drones, and consumed approximately 90 minutes of actual flight time. The rest of his 18-hour shift was spent watching reconnaissance feeds, maintaining equipment, charging batteries, assembling replacement drones, and drinking coffee. He hands over to the night shift, walks to his sleeping position in an adjacent bunker, and falls asleep with his boots on. He will do the same thing tomorrow, and the day after, and the day after that.

War continues.

It never really stopped.

S

Soufiane NourredineWrites about agentic AI, autonomous flight and SAP S/4HANA at nourredine.tech.