28.1 Weakened Conventional Deterrence
If cheap drone warfare weakens conventional deterrence—making it easier for smaller nations to challenge larger ones and harder for superpowers to achieve quick victories—the question arises whether the nuclear threshold lowers in compensation. A nation that cannot defeat an adversary conventionally may be tempted to escalate to nuclear weapons rather than accept a grinding attritional defeat.
Russia’s nuclear doctrine explicitly reserves the right to use nuclear weapons when the existence of the state is threatened. Three years into a war that has consumed over a million casualties without achieving its political objectives, the distance between current conditions and that threshold—while still significant—is smaller than it was in February 2022. Drone warfare did not create this dynamic, but by enabling Ukraine to impose costs that Russia’s conventional military cannot overcome, it has contributed to a strategic situation where nuclear escalation scenarios are discussed with a seriousness that would have seemed alarmist a decade ago.
28.2 Threats to Nuclear Arsenals
A more specific concern: can drone swarms threaten nuclear arsenals directly? Ukraine’s Sub Sea Baby underwater drone struck a Russian submarine at pier in Novorossiysk. Several of Russia’s ballistic missile submarines are based at facilities that may be similarly vulnerable. If autonomous underwater vehicles can penetrate harbor defenses and damage nuclear-armed submarines, the stability that nuclear second-strike capability provides could be undermined.
Similarly, swarms of cheap drones could theoretically threaten mobile missile launchers (TELs), nuclear command-and-control facilities, or early-warning radar systems. The ability of low-cost drones to strike hardened targets—demonstrated by Ukraine’s attacks on Russian missile bunkers and Iran’s underground missile cities—suggests that even nuclear infrastructure designed to survive conventional attack may be vulnerable to mass drone assault.
The strategic implications are profound. If a nation’s nuclear deterrent can be degraded by autonomous drone attacks, the incentive structure shifts toward use-it-or-lose-it calculations that make nuclear war more likely, not less. Maintaining the credibility and survivability of nuclear deterrent forces in the drone age will require significant investment in counter-drone defenses for nuclear facilities, diversification of nuclear delivery systems, and clear communication about red lines that should not be tested.
28.3 The Stabilizing Argument
Conversely, some analysts argue that drone warfare makes nuclear use less likely by providing nations with effective non-nuclear options for imposing costs on adversaries. Ukraine has inflicted devastating damage on Russian military capability and economic infrastructure without any nuclear dimension. Iran’s proxy network and drone arsenal give it strategic tools that reduce the pressure to develop or use nuclear weapons. If a nation can achieve its strategic objectives through cheap drone warfare, the motivation to cross the nuclear threshold diminishes.
The balance of these arguments—whether drones raise or lower nuclear risk—may depend on the specific conflict. In cases where drone warfare provides a credible alternative to nuclear escalation, it is stabilizing. In cases where drone warfare creates situations of conventional defeat that a nuclear power cannot accept, it is destabilizing. The world is conducting this experiment in real time.